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Introduction
Although Catholicism is presently the dominant religion 
in Brazil, the Evangelical churches have made significant 
inroads into the social and political life of  Latin Ameri-
can states over the past 30 years. The current strength of  
the Evangelical churches is immediately visible in con-
temporary Brazil and they are major commercial crusad-
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ers. In 1991, 9% of  Brazilians identified as Evangelical 
while 83% were Catholic (Pena, 2012). In 2010, a joint 
study by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísti-
ca and Fundação Getúlio Vargas, found that 20% of  
Brazilians identified as Evangelical and the number of  
Catholics had dropped to 68% (Ibid). 
The number of  Evangelical representatives and sen-
ators in politics has continued to increase in state and 
national political institutions.  A survey by the Interun-
ion Parliamentary Advisory Department, concluded that 
the Evangelical Congress Caucus has increased by 50% 
since 2008 to 63 representatives out of  513 and three 
senators out of  81, as of  2012. (Pena, 2012). In 2018, the 
Catholic-born but re-baptized as Evangelical, Jair Bol-
sonaro, became the Brazilian President.
Ignoring Brazil’s boundaries of  race and class, Evangel-
ical churches have successfully penetrated Brazil’s fave-
las, to convert the poorest to their doctrine (Hartropp, 
2017). These mass conversions from Catholicism to 
Evangelism has had a profound impact on Brazilian so-
cial and political life. Brazil, the country with the world’s 
largest Catholic population, and Latin America, a region 
which is synonymous with the Catholic church, are ex-
periencing a mass exodus of  people converting to Evan-
gelical churches. The loose structure of  these Evangeli-
cal churches allows virtually anyone who can read a bible 
to become a preacher.
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Evangelicalism as a conservative strand of  Christianity 
was weaponized by Washington to ensure Brazilians and 
other Latin Americans become fundamental believers in 
American culture and free enterprise. More dangerous-
ly for the working class however, their variant of  evan-
gelicalism promotes individual salvation through mate-
rial wealth and normalizes the outcomes of  American 
neo-liberal economics. 
Weaponization of  Evangelicalism against the Latin 
American Left
Since the end of  the 19th century, Latin America had 
been seen by Washington as its ‘Western Hemisphere.’ 
As the global struggle between capitalism and com-
munism during the Cold War intensified in the 1970s, 
especially after American imperialism’s defeat in Viet-
nam, mass social and armed struggles against Amer-
ican-sponsored regimes arose in Central America, and 
more broadly throughout Latin America. In the context 
of  these struggles, one response of  the Catholic Church 
was Liberation Theology. Liberation theology was an 
amalgam of  Catholic social justice doctrine and a so-
cialist analysis of  impoverished and exploited peoples 
of  the Third World (Aman, 1984-85: 427-438). It was 
seen by Washington as an ideological threat to Ameri-
can domination of  its ‘Western Hemisphere.’ Liberation 
theology became a motivating force in the struggle for 
social and economic liberation. Washington viewed the 
power of  liberation theology as an accomplice of  Marx-
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ist revolution in Latin America. To meet this challenge 
to American hegemony in Latin America, Washington 
turned to the Evangelical churches of  America.
A 1969 memorandum sent to US President Richard 
Nixon, from his Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, a 
Baptist, stated, “the Catholic church [in Latin America] 
has ceased to be an ally in whom the US can have confi-
dence” (Elvy, 1987: 98). Rockefeller’s strategy to counter 
the supposed Marxism of  the Catholic church’s Libera-
tion Theology was to send Protestant missionaries into 
Latin America.
The use of  religious leaders and groups was not a new 
method for Washington to impose its hegemony across 
the globe, such as the Catholic church’s endorsement of  
the 1964 Brazilian military coup and the organization 
of  the mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 
(Krischke, 2007: 403-427; Coll, 2005). The Watergate 
scandal involving President Nixon led to the formation 
by the US Senate of  the Church Committee, chaired by 
Senator Frank Church (U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 1976). The Church Committee attempted to 
examine the operations and activities of  the CIA, mainly 
because it was caught spying on US citizens (Ibid). The 
Church Committee report released in 1975 revealed that 
religious leaders and groups were used by the CIA to un-
dermine the Catholic church in Latin America, but did 
not get into deep detail as could be expected. It stated, 
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The number of  American clergy or missionaries 
used by the CIA has been small. The CIA has in-
formed the Committee of  a total of  14 covert ar-
rangements which involved direct operational use of  
21 individuals… In six or seven cases, the CIA paid 
salaries, bonuses, or expenses to the religious person-
nel, or helped to fund projects run by them. Most of  
the individuals were used for covert action purposes. 
Several were involved in large covert action projects 
of  the mid-Sixties, which were directed at “compet-
ing” with communism in the Third World (Internet 
Archive – US Government, 1976).
However, a study by Eric Draitser showed that the 
“small number” of  21 operatives provided by the CIA 
were listed as only of  “direct operational use.” Draits-
er (2014) argues that the report overlooked the “many 
[operatives] who may have interacted with the agency 
through proxies and other third parties, as well as those 
who, through various front operations, may have not 
even known that they were working for the agency.” 
He explains that since the report’s release in 1975, “the 
scope and breadth of  US covert actions has grown dra-
matically, encompassing nearly every political, economic, 
social, technological and cultural sphere” (Ibid). Draitser 
concludes that the 1975 report “deals exclusively with 
the CIA. It does not include other intelligence agencies 
and their various offshoots including the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency (DIA), State Department with its atten-
dant National Endowment for Democracy (NED), US 
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Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
many more” (Ibid). Gerard Colby and Charlotte Den-
net in their book Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of  the 
Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of  Oil 
(1995), explain that Rockefeller used American Evangel-
ical missionaries, and in particular, the Summer Institute 
of  Linguistics, to conduct surveys, transport CIA agents 
and indirectly assist in the genocide of  indigenous tribes 
in the Amazon basin to serve US  corporate interests.
The Rockefeller-supported missionaries' first major re-
ligious conversion success occurred in Guatemala when 
the general and dictator José Efraín Ríos Montt became 
a Pentecostal church member (Gunson, 2018). Montt 
used Guatemalan television and radio stations to broad-
cast the Pentecostal doctrine and denounce the mythical 
collaboration between the Catholic church and Marxism 
(Severo, 2018). 
In the article, “The First Religious War of  the 21st Cen-
tury,” Mike Rivage-Seul argued that “The Rockefeller 
Report of  1969 already identified liberation theology as 
a threat to the national security of  the United States… 
The [Reagan] administration heeded the advice, and re-
sponded both militarily and ideologically” (Rivage-Seul, 
2012). He added, that “As for Reagan’s ideological re-
sponse to liberation theology.... On his accession to 
power, CIA spy-ops began funding conservative alterna-
tives to liberation theology in Latin America and in the 
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US so did business concerns that saw the leftward drift 
of  Latin America as a threat to their presence there” 
(Ibid). With the collapse of  the Soviet Union in 1991, 
efforts to Evangelize Latin America were mostly aban-
doned and the weaponized Evangelicals are now used 
to justify war in the Middle East, especially against Iran 
(Borger, 2019).
The Evangelical theology claims that poverty and drug 
and alcohol addiction are personal and spiritual failings. 
In this respect, according to neoliberal dogma, poverty is 
a symptom of  personal failure and not the consequenc-
es of  the economic system. Many Evangelical church-
es, like neoliberalism, aggressively oppose government 
funding to assist the poor. Evangelical theology is con-
gruent with the ideas of  neoliberalism and has served 
as a sort of  Trojan horse for its entry into Latin Ameri-
can society through US intelligence agencies, as already 
explored. Neoliberalism has relied on Evangelicalism to 
alter Latin American culture and political economy to 
become more subservient to US ideological hegemo-
ny. The entire operation to Evangelize Latin America, 
spearheaded by the CIA, was to create a culture shift that 
would undermine the Left-leaning Catholic church and 
its influence on Latin American people into accepting 
the free market and US corporate domination.
Evangelical impacts on Brazilian society
The rise of  Evangelicalism has significantly impacted 
Brazilian social life with the tide of  conservatism that it 
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brought to Latin America’s largest state. It has brought 
social and moral issues such as abortion and homosexu-
ality to the forefront of  Brazil’s political national agenda 
at the expense of  more important political and econom-
ic reforms such as taxation and welfare.
Evangelical church services bring charismatic preaching, 
as well expressive prayer and singing, which are often 
absent in the liturgical and symbolically rich Catholic 
church. Whereas the Catholic church remains tradition-
al in its proselytization, Evangelical churches has suc-
cessfully engaged Brazilian youth, ;articularly through 
social media. With smartphones becoming increasingly 
popular and widespread across Brazil, this has meant 
that social media platforms, accessible in seconds with 
smartphones, allow the young access to new informa-
tion and be engaged through new methods (Kath and 
Knijnik, 2015: 873). Non-gospel music, such as Brazilian 
funk, afro-reggae and rock, but with Christian lyrics, is 
also played in some Evangelical churches as a means to 
attract the youth. Through engagement with this music, 
the young become evangelised, and are influenced by the 
church in shaping their social and political views. 
As a stratum of  petty-bourgeois youth in Brazil’s south-
eastern centres of  São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, they 
have become increasingly attracted to the politics of  
identity (Tisdall, 2018). The Evangelical churches pro-
vide a defence of  traditional conservative Christian val-
ues. Pastor Everaldo in São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city, 
stated that: “We defend life of  the human being since 
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its conception. We defend the Brazilian family. We de-
fend this clearly: marriage is between a man and wom-
an” (Garcia-Navarro, 2014). Homosexual marriage was 
legalised in Brazil following a Supreme Court decision 
of  May 2013. Evangelicals have mounted a political 
campaign to reverse this court decision (Boadle, 2018). 
Jean Wyllys, a homosexual activist affiliated with the So-
cialism and Liberty Party and a former member of  Bra-
zil’s parliament, stated that: “But it’s a legal precedent 
that could still be overturned by conservative judges. 
As long as there is no law, our rights are not protected” 
(Oualalou, 2014). Some Evangelicals want a new law in 
which homosexuality is to be ‘treated’ as a psychological 
problem (Feder, 2015). The Evangelicals’ anti- homo-
sexual campaign may have a major impact on Brazilian 
youth to not only oppose the gay marriage law but have 
it replaced by Evangelical-inspired legislation which out-
laws’ homosexuality and treats it as a medical or psy-
chological disorder (Ibid). Thus increasing numbers of  
Brazilians are ibeing nfluenced by the message of  Evan-
gelical pastors and are gravitating towards conservatism, 
including the poor and working class (Datafolha, 2017). 
This is compunded by the Brazilian Left's turn to the 
contemporary western liberal norms. The Brazilian 
working class do not identify with modern Western 
identity political issues such as the normalization of  
transgenderism, the normalization of  trans-species, etc. 
(Singal, 2017). The Brazilian workers and the poorest 
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elements of  society are ignored by the petty-bourgeois 
Left of  southeast Brazil who campaign on these afore-
mentioned social issues, and abandoned class politics. 
This has created a conservative reaction which promises 
to provide jobs and opportunities for the poorest peo-
ple in Brazil. The Catholic church as a social institution 
has also effectively ended its mission to uplift the poor. 
Hervé Théry of  the University of  São Paulo states that: 
“The evangelical churches provide a kind of  social aid, 
leisure activities and a genuine listening ear, which the 
Catholic Church has almost given up doing. It’s one of  
the reasons for their success” (Ibid). This is an admis-
sion the National Catholic Reporter had to make (Allen 
Jr., 2013). The communal aspect of  Evangelicalism fills 
a social void that the state, Brazilian Left and Catholic 
Church have failed to address. By filling this void, the 
Evangelical churches have galvanized their followers to 
support discriminatory policies which are contrary to 
their class interests. 
The favelas of  Brazil are massive and permanent squat-
ter settlements inhabited by those forgotten by the 
Brazilian state and often denied access to healthcare, 
education, sanitation, transportation or property rights 
of  other Brazilians. The Catholic Church in Brazil was 
never prepared for this massive influx of  the rural poor 
into the favelas. Millions of  rural Brazilians migrated 
to the cities throughout the 20th century for econom-
ic opportunities and metropolitan areas were unable to 
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provide these new rural migrants with work, housing, 
food or other essential social services. On the outskirts 
of  many Brazilian cities, these rural migrants established 
their own makeshift permanent communities in favelas 
(Eakin, 2017: 91). Life in the favelas was hard, desperate 
and unpredictable. The urban poor of  the favelas be-
came Brazil’s underclass. “The government doesn’t help 
us, so God is the only option for the poor,” Evangelical 
Pastor Antonio, a former drug dealer, explained (Arse-
nault, 2017).
The Evangelical churches claim to help those in the fave-
las fight against poverty, unemployment, crime, mental 
health, while also providing education and economic de-
velopment (Ibid). It is for this reason that the political 
landscape in Brazil is changing as the poor communi-
ties shift to the Right spectrum of  politics as the Left 
have abandoned the class struggle for identity politics 
and “the Catholics have shown themselves to be incapa-
ble,” according to Cesar Romero Jacob of  the Pontifical 
Catholic University of  Rio de Janeiro (Oualalou, 2014).
Sometimes these social changes include fundamentalism 
with violence against non-believers, which is becoming 
increasingly common in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. The 
Bandidos Evangélicos (Evangelical Bandits), are born-
again Evangelical gangsters from the favelas, who have 
started a campaign of  violence against believers of  Um-
banda and Candomblé, a religion that fuses Catholicism 
with African spiritual beliefs. Robert Muggah, research 
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director of  the Igarapé Institute in Rio, explained that 
“The latest wave of  religious-inspired violence can be 
traced to the turn toward evangelicalism in many parts 
of  Rio de Janeiro, especially low-income settings such as 
favelas” (Schipani and Leahy, 2017). The large numbers 
of  criminals converting to Evangelicalism have emerged 
as a body of  frontline spiritual soldiers ready to enforce 
the sect’s religious code within the favelas. Their Evan-
gelical zeal may change the fabric of  social life in the 
favelas. Brazil’s famous favelas are the home to a unique 
cultural aspect and where many of  Brazil’s famous danc-
es, Brazilian funk and afro-reggae music, and arts origi-
nated (Resende, Souza and Costa, 2011: 136). How the 
conservative Evangelical church will affect these unique 
aspects of  Brazilian culture is unknown.  
However, the Evangelical churches have attempted to 
improve social life in the favelas. Evangelical churches 
have provided basic services such as employment assis-
tance and education to those living in the favelas (Ar-
senault, 2017). Because of  their social interventions in 
the favelas and the Left’s neglect to the needs of  the 
poor, many in the favelas have turned to the Evangelical 
churches as their saviours. 
Many Brazilians feel that their lives have worsened since 
the ascendancy of  neoliberalism in the economy and the 
moral decline of  the Catholic church which is continu-
ously caught up in sex and paedophilia scandals in Latin 
America (Malzac, 2019). In this context of  social and 
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moral decay, the Evangelical churches offer the certain-
ties of  traditional values, the preservation of  the family 
unit and a strong adherence to the literal Bible. Howev-
er, Rogerio Baptistini of  Mackenzie Presbyterian Uni-
versity argues that: 
The growth in evangelical Christianity is taking place 
without a deep discussion of  the values enshrined in 
our historical character. We are an open and tolerant 
society, but this sudden growth threatens rationali-
ty, the denial of  the other, the diverse, the different 
(Schweimler, 2016).
Baptistini is referring to the Evangelical churches an-
ti-gay stance: and, in the context of  Rio de Janeiro’s 
favelas, the killings and beatings of  those practising Um-
banda and Candomblé. He presents a strong case that 
the Evangelical church threatens the diversity and dif-
ference within Brazilian society. At the political level, the 
decline of  the Left and the resurgence of  conservatism 
is spearheaded by both neoliberal economic forces, and 
the rapid expansion of  the Evangelical churches. The 
changes in Brazilian society and social life correspond to 
the changes in its politics.
The Evangelical Church in Brazil: A Business to 
Exploit the Poor?
The lack of  central authority with Evangelical church 
allows charismatic and engaging individuals with little 
253
Postcolonial Interventions, Vol. V, Issue 2
knowledge of  the bible and no theological training to 
become preachers who open their own churches, which 
allows for the church’s rapid expansion. Their followers 
are some of  Brazil’s poorest people whose generosity 
and faith they exploit for their own worldly gain, as will 
be demonstrated.
Pentecostalism is the dominant tendency of  the Evan-
gelical churches in Brazil. Its central tenet is that an active 
presence of  God remains in the world and that people, 
just like Jesus, Peter and Paul, can access this divine pow-
er and speak in tongues, banish addictions and heal the 
sick, and in extreme cases, resurrect the dead (Nzwili, 
2019). Armed with the belief  in divine intervention and 
their connection to divine power, Evangelical preachers 
promise significant material wealth to their poor believ-
ers. Evangelical churches offer the slogan “stop suffer-
ing,” as only faith in God will make you rich, bringing 
hope to poor Brazilians (Ubags, 2015). This is the basis 
of  the Evangelical prosperity theology. 
The prosperity gospel promises the believer that by giv-
ing money to their church, praying and adhering to strict 
social rules such as not drinking alcohol, smoking and 
having sex outside of  marriage, a structured life is cre-
ated and material rewards will result. Paul Freston, a so-
ciologist and an expert in Pentecostalism in Latin Amer-
ica, stated that: “You learn to see yourself  as an agent 
who has possibilities, who has the ability with God’s help 
to achieve things, to get control of  yourself. It doesn’t 
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mean you become rich, but it often means you rise from 
absolute destitution to dignified poverty” (Bailey, 2017). 
Although the original Protestant movement in 16th cen-
tury Catholic Europe arose from Martin Luther’s con-
demnation of  the Vatican’s power and corruption, the 
Evangelical promise of  personal wealth by donating to 
its Brazilian churches bears a striking resemblance to the 
medieval Catholic Church’s sale of  ‘indulgences’ for the 
forgiveness of  sins.
A 2013 Forbes report found that prominent Evangel-
ical preachers who advocated the prosperity theology 
were the richest pastors in Brazil (Antunes, 2013). The 
report listed Edir Macedo, the founder and leader of  
the Universal Church of  the Kingdom of  God, and at 
the time of  the report, having a net worth $950 million 
(Ibid). Macedo, the author of  books criticising Catholi-
cism and Afro-Brazilian religions owned Brazil’s second 
largest broadcaster, Rede Record; the Folha Universal 
newspaper; Record News channel; music label compa-
nies; several properties; and, a $45 million jet. The funds 
for these commodities were from the donations made 
to his church. Macedo is alleged to have siphoned bil-
lions of  dollars of  donations projected for charity; and, 
has had charges of  fraud and money laundering levelled 
against him (Ibid).  Other leading Evangelical preachers 
are Valdemiro Santiago whose estimated wealth is $220 
million; followed by Silas Malafaia with $150 million; 
Romildo Ribeiro Soares, owning $125 million; and, Es-
255
Postcolonial Interventions, Vol. V, Issue 2
tevam Hernandes Filho and his wife Sonia sharing $65 
million (Ibid).
Contemporary Brazil is in economic recession, with un-
employment at 13% in 2017 and the extreme poverty 
level at 4.3% and overall poverty at 25% recorded in 
2015 (Cascione, 2017). The promise of  individual salva-
tion and wealth by donating to the Evangelical church 
resonates deeply with the poorest in Brazilian society 
(The World Bank, 2017). A Washington Post report 
quoted Gabriel Camargo, a Pentecostal pastor with the 
Universal Church of  the Kingdom of  God, declaring 
“God will bless you if  you give a lot more to the church. 
You’ll have so much money,” and providing for indi-
vidual donations through a credit card payment (Bailey, 
2017). 
Apart from the promise of  great material wealth for do-
nating to the church, some Evangelical churches feature 
charismatic child preachers. Evangelical Pastor Walter 
Luz estimates there are thousands (Shapiro, 2015). These 
children implore congregations to make donations to the 
church, promote the sale of  DVD’s of  their sermons, 
CD’s of  their music and undertake long preaching tours 
around the world to promote their brand (Ibid). The en-
gagement of  charismatic children to promote their spir-
itual message indicates the commercial purpose of  these 
Evangelical churches where theological study and training 
are not required of  their evangelists. 
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Although only a minority of  the plenitude of  Evangeli-
cal churches engage in this practice, those which do have 
turned their churches into billion-dollar businesses and 
command most Evangelical believers (Antunes, 2013). 
In contrast, many Evangelical preachers are poor like 
their followers and hope to make money by opening 
commercialized churches. Beginning in 2000, as many 
as 40 new Evangelical churches opened weekly in Rio 
de Janeiro, according to Roberto Inacio, director of  an 
Assemblies of  God Bible institute in Rio (The Gospel 
Herald, 2003). It is not uncommon in Brazil, such as 
Vitória in Espírito Santo, to see two Evangelical church-
es directly next to or opposite each other. This would 
indicate that with these churches in close proximity to 
each other, business promotion rather than preaching 
the word of  God is their principal objective. 
The immediate material reward in the present life that 
some Evangelical churches promise, rather than the 
spiritual afterlife as the Catholic faith offers, is the il-
lusion which draws impoverished Brazilians into the 
Evangelical fold. Nevertheless, the attractions of  con-
sumerism took hold in the favelas. It proved to be the 
ideal social setting for the message of  the Evangelical 
churches which promised the poor a way to escape from 
their oppression after their traditional values had failed. 
Evangelicalism offered them individual salvation and a 
consumerist lifestyle which would be blessed by God. 
257
Postcolonial Interventions, Vol. V, Issue 2
The Evangelical leaders through their prosperity theolo-
gy found true believers in the poor of  Brazil.
Leading Pentecostals in the US are critical of  the pros-
perity doctrine promoted by some Evangelicals (Cole-
man, 2000: 27). In 1980, the General Council of  the 
Assemblies of  God stated that prosperity theology 
overlooked the importance of  prayer as the method 
for requests to God and not simply positive confession 
(General Council of  the Assemblies of  God, 1980: 5). 
They concluded that the doctrine only appealed to those 
in developing states (General Council of  the Assem-
blies of  God, 1980: 8). This Pentecostal criticism of  the 
prosperity gospel was made a decade before the tide of  
Evangelicalism had reached Brazil. Since the 1990s the 
growth of  the Evangelical church has exploded in Bra-
zil, particularly among the impoverished (Pew Research 
Center, 2013). Whereas in the US Evangelicalism was 
largely a middle-class social phenomenon, in Brazil the 
majority of  its adherents are poor.
Evangelicalism in Brazilian Politics
Electoral politicians who uphold conservative values 
against abortion and homosexuality are increasingly 
aligned with the Evangelical churches which ideological-
ly support them (Bohn 2004, 2007). This electoral trend 
was demonstrated in the second-round presidential elec-
tions of  2002 with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), with 
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his re-election in 2006 (Ibid) and in the successive victo-
ries of  Dilma Rousseff  (Alessi, 2016), and the election 
of  Bolsonaro to the presidency in 2018. This growing 
trend demonstrates the influence of  Evangelicalism in 
the electoral successes of  the Workers Party (PT) and 
was symbolized by the presence of  Rousseff  at the inau-
guration of  the “Temple of  Solomon” of  the Evangel-
ical Universal Church of  the Kingdom of  God – in the 
presence of  its religious leader Edir Macedo in 2014 (So-
brinho, 2014; Watts, 2014). Prior to this event, Marcelo 
Crivella, the mayor of  Rio de Janeiro and an Evangelical 
bishop, was appointed Minister of  Fisheries, by Rous-
seff  in 2012 (Boadle, 2013).
The PT’s social policies had an initial affinity with ele-
ments of  the Evangelical doctrine. The PT attempted 
to address the needs of  the faithful and the poor who in 
the absence of  state action sought solutions to the prob-
lems of  income, employment, education, health and 
family stability (Bohn, 2004; Potter et al., 2014). How-
ever, the Evangelicals withdrew their political support 
for any political representative charged with corruption 
and dishonesty and when the anti-corruption operations 
against targeted politicians began, the Evangelicals with-
drew their support for leading corrupt PT politicians. 
The investigations into the corruption of  leading polit-
ical figures led to a crisis of  legitimacy in the Brazilian 
State. In response to these revelations of  high corrup-
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tion, the Evangelicals have mobilized politically with 
Mario Crivella elected as the mayor of  Rio de Janeiro. 
His mayoral victory represents not only a political con-
solidation of  Evangelicals, in the legislative branch, but 
also in executive power. In the context of  this legitima-
cy crisis, the Evangelicals, have benefitted politically as 
there is a popular rejection of  traditional political class 
from the Left and the Right, as well as secular represen-
tation itself. (Janoni, 2016). 
In this sense, what is observed is the consolidation of  a 
vacuum of  power that was affected by the evident ab-
sence of  political options, precipitated by the moderate 
Left's involvement in institutionalised corruption. This 
affected its own legitimacy and led to the subsequent 
takeover of  this empty political space by those who sup-
posedly express interest in a population already aban-
doned by the state.
It can be argued that there is the weight and responsi-
bility of  the moderate Left, where it showed a political 
accommodation with the Evangelicals, whose potential 
for political mobilization could change Brazilian elec-
tions (Bohn, 2007). Political Evangelicalism may even 
find an affinity with Catholics in a supra-religious and 
non-liberal agenda, directed towards an economic stat-
ism linked to anti-abortion and anti-homosexual moral 
agenda (Bohn, 2004).
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In Brazilian national policy, Crivella may represent the 
reflection of  an Evangelical beginning. Evangelicals by 
their religious agenda in politics, allow the fall of  a mask 
and reveal the true face of  a national mentality, which 
qualifies as difficult to accept institutional and social 
changes. And the true face is Christian moralism, which 
is presently beyond the scope of  individual religious be-
liefs, and expresses a notion of  society that has not yet 
allowed itself  to reflect clearly on its values. The inclu-
sion of  Evangelicals in the political agenda, in this sense, 
opens an opportunity for reflection.
Moreover, Crivella's election also reflects a natural ten-
dency of  representativeness and legitimacy at the appro-
priate time from a significant population niche that until 
then had been abandoned by the state and by the social 
patterns of  the Left and the traditional creeds - not to 
mention the decadence of  legitimacy in the absence of  
identity of  the last governments that sought a relative 
approximation.
The reflection of  this is the approximation of  the pop-
ulation in another social meander, not only in religion, 
but also in the intricacies of  the bureaucratic appara-
tuses of  the State. Opportunities for the Evangelical 
population are reflected, no longer in the close nuclei of  
each citizen, but in the generic scope of  broader appli-
cations of  possible public policies. And the induction is 
not because of  the specific condition of  the Evangelical 
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churches, but with the significant role of  the Left, by 
the acceptance of  the Evangelical vote and subsequent 
participation in their governments, as well as by the mor-
alistic reinforcement of  Catholicism and other creeds of  
traditional conservatism.
President Bolsonaro: Brazil’s Evangelical Champi-
on
Bolsonaro, an ultra-conservative former military offi-
cer-turned-politician, capitalized on the fall of  the PT. 
With 54% of  Brazilians holding a conservative view ac-
cording to a 2016 survey (Almeida, 2017), the continued 
Liberal Left attack on traditional values saw voters turn 
to Bolsonaro as their defender. Out of  all of  Brazil’s 
Christian sects, the Evangelicals were the most ardent 
supporters of  Bolsonaro with nearly 70% of  them vot-
ing for him (Machado, 2018).
His denominational allegiance remains a mystery in Bra-
zil. He was born a Catholic and has never renounced 
Catholicism but he was videoed being baptized in the 
Jordan River by Pastor Everaldo - a prominent leader 
of  the Assembly of  God and the head of  the Christian 
Social Party who also ran for President in 2014 - in May 
2016 (Smith and Lloyd, 2018). This symbolic act coupled 
with his ultra-conservatism, was enough for Bolsonaro 
to garner the overwhelming support from this powerful 
minority bloc. Whether he identifies as Evangelical, or 
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made the move to gain a powerful minority vote, his 
presidential election demonstrates a significant politi-
cal-cultural shift in Brazil. In the fourteen years before 
Bolsonaro’s presidency, Brazil was governed by a pro-
gressive Leftist party which supported identity politics 
and continually challenged the natural Christian conser-
vatism of  the country (Lero and Bello, 2015).
To galvanize the political support of  the Evangelicals, 
Bolsonaro promised to move the Brazilian Embassy in 
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He made it one of  
his main policy goals by continually mentioning this on 
the presidential election campaign trail (The Guardian, 
2019). Brazilian Evangelicals were elated by this Bolson-
aro promise. The Evangelicals believe that there will be 
a future golden age when Jesus Christ returns to reign 
on Earth. Before Christ’s return there would be a time 
of  tribulation where Christ defeats evil; only after natu-
ral disasters, wars and the Antichrist devastate the world 
(Illing, 2018). After these tribulations, the Evangelicals 
believe that the people of  the Mosaic covenant, includ-
ing the Jews who will convert to Christianity, will bring 
forth the golden age (Ibid). Evangelicals hold the be-
lief  that when the Jewish people reclaim the Holy Land, 
that the world will move closer to the second coming 
of  Christ. Evangelicals have been described as Christian 
Zionists, as they have supported the expansionist drive 
of  the state of  Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Terri-
tories and the annexed Golan Heights region of  Syria. 
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For Christian Zionists, these actions represent the Jew-
ish reclamation of  the Holy Land.   
One of  Bolsonaro’s first statements after becoming 
President-Elect was to announce the relocation of  Bra-
zil’s embassy in Israel, “As previously stated during our 
campaign, we intend to transfer the Brazilian Embassy 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Israel is a sovereign state and 
we shall duly respect that.” The Bolsonaro announce-
ment followed US President Donald Trump’s decision 
to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv 
to Jerusalem. In a later statement, Bolsonaro threatened 
to close the Palestinian Embassy in the Brazilian capital, 
saying: “Is Palestine a country? Palestine is not a country, 
so there should be no embassy here,” and “We do not 
negotiate with terrorists” (Donati, 2018). These state-
ments were immediately endorsed by Israeli officials, 
including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Zion, 
2019). Bolsonaro refuted Brazil’s long-standing neutrali-
ty on the question of  Palestine.
The Brazilian embassy move has not happened as many 
within Bolsonaro’s party, including Vice President Ham-
ilton Mourão, as well as the powerful Agricultural Minis-
try, opposed the move, arguing that it would significantly 
harm trade relations with Arab countries (Antonopou-
los, 2019). Their opposition was announced after Arab 
states threatened to stop Brazilian imports if  the embas-
sy was relocated to Jerusalem. In 2017, Brazil had a $419 
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million trade deficit with Israel compared to a $7.1 bil-
lion surplus with the 22 states of  the Arab League – ac-
counting for 10% of  Brazil’s total trade surplus (Doug-
las and Freitas, 2018). 
Although Bolsonaro was unsuccessful in moving the 
embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, he found great 
success in presenting himself  as a defender of  social 
conservatism. With Evangelicals taking a strong posi-
tion over issues of  life, family, sexuality, gender roles and 
faith, they believe Bolsonaro will mobilize Brazilians to 
defend their faith and moral values. As the majority of  
Brazilians claim to hold conservative values, Bolsonaro 
has mobilized communities around moral and social is-
sues. Bolsonaro has brought religion and morality to the 
forefront of  Brazils’ political and public life, something 
that was especially lacking under the PT government.  
Bolsonaro’s verbal attacks against ethnic minorities, ho-
mosexuals and Marxists, highlights the insecurities of  
Evangelicals who felt threatened by the liberal political 
and social order that emerged under the PT government. 
Bolsonaro’s alignment to the Evangelical vision has meant 
that specific religious factors dominate Brazilian domes-
tic and foreign policy in what has been historically an ex-
emplary secular state (Winter, 2019). Although Bolsona-
ro has not renounced Catholicism, his wife and children 
are Evangelical, and his strong endorsement of  Israel has 
confirmed him as an Evangelical political champion.
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Conclusion
The explosive growth of  Evangelicalism in Brazil is un-
precedented and not evident anywhere else in the world. 
Evangelicalism is predicted to be the majority religion 
in Brazil by 2030 and will become a political and social 
juggernaut (Hennigan, 2013). Evangelical adherents col-
lectively can influence politicians and use broadcast and 
social media, to promote their conservative values. After 
Catholicism was forced upon the people of  Latin Amer-
ica by the Iberian colonists, it had faced no threat to its 
religious dominance until the rapid advance of  contem-
porary Evangelicalism.
The Evangelical leadership has successfully changed the 
lives of  millions of  Brazilians by influencing the ways they 
dress, what they eat, the music they listen to, and the can-
didates they vote for in elections. Evangelicals are encour-
aged to vote only for Evangelical candidates. As they are 
projected to become the religious and political majority, it 
can only be expected that the world’s first openly Pente-
costal or Neo-Pentecostal president will be in Brazil. Bol-
sonaro has not renounced his Catholicism and was only 
recently baptized by an Assembly of  God pastor.
The Evangelical influence will be felt in society if  it 
successfully dominates Brazilian politics. The recent 
changes in Brazilian society, the legalization of  same 
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sex marriage, the debate over the decriminalization of  
drugs, safe-sex education in schools and the distribu-
tion of  clean and unused needles to drug addicts, will be 
challenged or reversed by the rising tide of  Evangelical 
conservatism under the Bolsonaro administration. The 
most direct issue that the Evangelical church must re-
solve is its loose structure where some of  its ministries 
allow children and people with no theological training 
to preach and/or open their own churches. Although 
this in itself  is not necessarily bad, the exploitation of  
children must be closely monitored.
More importantly, the loose structure must be consol-
idated so that churches that preach prosperity theolo-
gy can be closed and exposed for their false doctrine 
interpretations. This remains one of  the most immedi-
ate issues to the Evangelical church brand in Brazil and 
the source for one of  its greatest criticisms, despite the 
attraction it has to the poor. The social assistance car-
ried out by the Evangelical church for Brazil’s impover-
ished, particularly in the favelas, has a specific political 
purpose: to win followers to its doctrine and program. 
In the favelas, the Evangelical church relies on its pet-
ty criminal foot soldiers to attack the followers of  Af-
ro-Brazilian religions.
What is certain however is that with the rise of  the 
Evangelical church, it is inevitable that it will become a 
social and political force in Brazil. How Brazilian soci-
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ety integrates this phenomenon in its entirety cannot be 
predicted. In the short term, under the Bolsonaro presi-
dency, the Evangelical church will continue to deepen its 
influence over Brazilians and convert its mass following 
among the poor towards conservatism. 
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